Honneth refers to another distinction between himself and Ranciére, which is relevant: between an “inner” struggle and an “external struggle for recognition” (p. 105-106). While Honneth Ranciére attributes a theoretical interest to “the interruption of the whole normative order”, he himself is interested in the internal struggle for recognition, which “does not call into question the existing principles of recognition… But challenges existing interpretations” (p. 105). Although I agree with Honneth, I believe that this is precisely where the decisive paradox of Ranciére`s policy lies: if one thinks of acts of interruption by groups that question the normative order, Ranciére nevertheless refuses to claim the institutionalization of the “revolutionary” policy of disagreement or the creation of a new or other order. In doing so, he even seems to be engaged in the internal struggle for recognition: “This means that political action is not just the negative interruption of the police regime… It inserts the impact of equality into our laws and practices. And these inscriptions, in turn, allow for new conflicts and political actions” (p. 125). Perica, I. Recognition or Disagreement: a critical encounter with the policy of freedom, equality and identity. Contemp Polit Theory 16, 394-397 (2017).

doi.org/10.1057/s41296-016-0082-y With regard to the two central notions of his “disagreement” – disagreement and recognition – Jean-Phillipe Deranty (2003) has already tried to read Ranciére`s understanding of political subjectivation near the idea of Honneth`s recognition (which is closely related to the idea of “ethical life” or morality). In this volume, Honneth attempts a similar rapprochement with Ranciéres and his own emancipatory thought. However, Rancier is rather skeptical of a subsumtion of his own theoretical position under the vocabulary of the theory of recognition. Since the theory of recognition includes dimensions of idealistic and individualistic philosophy and a “legal definition of the person” (p. 87), Ranciére believes that these hegelic remains are too high to pay for a general theory of the subject. This is clear from Honneth`s reaction to the “desire for egalitarianism” (p. 99) found in Ranciére`s disagreement (p. 102).

In his interpretation of political processes, Ranciére refutes any trace of “desire.” (Here, Deranty Ranciére reluctantly observes “antipsychologism,” p. 49.) However, as legitimate as Ranciére`s skepticism of possible intersections of political theory and (individual) psychology is, by completely rejecting the notion of “desire,” he seems to miss the opportunity to explain how or why the events of disagreements or, if we speak of aesthetics, the new distributions of reasonableness appear. It is not surprising that the volume begins with the following remarks: Axel Honneth is presented as “the famous German theorist of recognition who took over the legacy of the Frankfurt school and in particular of Jurgen Habermas” and Jacques Ranciére as “the important French thinker of disagreement (disagreement) who broke with the Althusian tradition” (p. 3, Genel). As renowned representatives of their respective theoretical backgrounds, Ranciére and Honneth meet as candidates. But, as critics of this context, they negotiate the many overlaps that closely merge their theoretical positions. It follows that Honneth`s views on politics and political orders are themselves two types of “order”, but they are not incompatible: Ranciére`s criticism of “police regulation” begins at the very moment when the “recognitive” order of honnethia shows its restrictiveness and even its cynicism.